This paper provides a selective survey of the incidence, causes, and consequences of a country's choice of its exchange rate regime. I begin with a critical review of Klein and Shambaugh's (2010) book Exchange Rate Regimes in the Modern Era, and then proceed to provide an alternative overview of what the economics professions knows and needs to know about exchange rate regimes. While a fixed exchange rate with capital mobility is a welldefined monetary regime, floating is not; thus, it is unclear whether it is theoretically sensible to compare countries across exchange rate regimes. This comparison is quite difficult to make empirically. It is often hard to figure out what the exchange rate regime of a country is in practice, since there are multiple conflicting regime classifications. More importantly, similar countries choose radically different exchange rate regimes without substantive consequences for macroeconomic outcomes like output growth and inflation. That is, the profession knows surprisingly little about either the causes or consequences of national choices of exchange rate regimes. But since the consequences of these choices are small, understanding their causes is of only academic interest.
What's International about International Finance?
The exchange rate is an important asset price, perhaps the most important asset price.
It's also a distinctive asset price. The price of Exxon stock or the 10-year Treasury bond rate fluctuates over time in a reasonably consistent manner. By way of contrast, the exchange rate has distinct, well-defined regimes which are chosen by the government and maintained by the central bank. No entity essentially ever attempts to peg the price of a stock or bond around a central parity with narrow fluctuation bands. 1 However, some economies do fix their exchange rates (for example, Denmark, or Hong Kong), while others do not (Canada, New Zealand) . A number of countries have changed their minds on the topic and switched regimes (Thailand in July 1997, Argentina in January 2002). Official authorities -at least some of them -clearly reveal through their policies that they care about the exchange rate. One would then like to understand both the motivation and the consequences of these decisions.
The fact that exchange rate policies vary across countries and time suggests that the causes and effects of exchange rate regimes can be understood both empirically and theoretically. Such is the compelling motivation for Exchange Rate Regimes in the Modern Era, a recent book by Michael Klein and Jay Shambaugh which summarizes work in the field. The focus is on the "modern era" since the Bretton Woods system (of widespread pegged exchange rates) finally collapsed in 1973. The authors provide a simple theoretical framework for their analysis by way of an informal introduction to two of Mundell's greatest hits; his trilemma (which states that open capital markets, fixed exchange rates and monetary sovereignty are mutually incompatible), and his theory of optimum currency areas (which provides the theoretical basis for a national money). But they really seek to summarize and extend the empirical work in the area of exchange rate regimes, much of which is their own.
The book is limited, but the book is good. It is pitched at a moderate technical level, easily accessible to masters' students, advanced undergraduates, and policy-makers. The prose is clear and accessible. Most of the chapters are self-contained pieces focusing on a welldefined topic, each with elementary theory, a literature review, and new empirics. The coverage is both comprehensive and balanced. All this is very much to the good. This slim volume is a valuable contribution to the literature.
The book is good, but the book is limited. It does not present a new theory, data set, or methodology. Much of it is based on Mundell's celebrated 1968 textbook, and uses conventional reduced-form regressions on easily accessible data sets. This is by design and enhances the accessibility of the book, while also limiting its research potential upside.
Who's What?
Klein and Shambaugh begin their study by reviewing the classifications of exchange rate regimes. One might think that splitting the world into countries that have fixed as opposed to floating exchange rate regimes is a trivial task, but far from it. In the bad old days, the IMF provided exchange rate regime classifications based upon official statements of de jure policy intent by the national authorities; these were used widely through the late twentieth century.
If Nicaragua said that it maintained a fixed exchange rate in 1990 at the height of a hyperinflation (as it did), then it was fixed according to the Fund. This was clearly an unsatisfactory state of affairs.
During the last decade, a number of exchange rate regime classifications have been developed, each of which relies on actual de facto behavior. The three best-known alternatives to de jure classifications are those developed by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003, hereafter "LYS") , Reinhart and Rogoff (2004, "RR") and Shambaugh (2004) . Each is based on a different technique. LYS combine data on exchange rates and international reserves using cluster analysis; that way they can account for exchange market intervention as well as exchange rate movements. RR rely on the movements of market-determined exchange rates; these often diverge from official ones when there are parallel or dual markets because of capital controls. Shambaugh classifies a country as pegged if its official exchange rate remains within a small band for a sufficiently long period of time. All the methods classify nominal exchange rate regimes.
The three systems based on de facto behavior have one striking common characteristic:
all reveal that the de jure classification is untrustworthy much of the time. Many countries that state they float actually intervene to smooth the exchange rate a lot (a phenomenon known as "fear of floating"). Conversely, many countries that state they peg have a lot of inflation and capital controls so that their currencies actually trade at deep discounts on black markets.
Accordingly, the profession has concluded that de facto classifications make a lot more sense than de jure ones. Indeed, the IMF has classified exchange rate regimes using a system based on actual behavior since the late 1990s (notably leading academic research by years). When it comes to exchange rate regimes, as with so many other things, the words of countries often do not correspond to their deeds.
But the differences between the three de facto systems are more apparent than their commonality. was floating, the classifications ranged from floating (LYS) through a narrow crawl (RR) to peg (Shambaugh) . The disagreements between the four systems are common, as shown in Table 1 below (reproduced from chapter 3 of the book).
So there are now four classifications of exchange rate regimes: official IMF, LYS, RR, and
Shambaugh. Klein and Shambaugh explore the reasons that these classifications do not overlap well. As is common in economics, they conclude that the different systems are simply measuring different things, and are thus useful in different contexts. This seems to me like slipping into a warm bath when a cold shower is more appropriate; to an outsider, it is scary that one can no longer say with confidence that currency x at time y was fixed, floating or whatever. (Ghosh et al, 2010; Rogoff et al, 2004) .
Scoring a Fix
Several of the strengths of the book are worth highlighting. grounds that lead RR to use black market exchange rates in their "natural" exchange rate regime classification; they classify Bolivia as "freely falling" for much of the same period. But
Shambaugh's classification has it as fixed (aside from the 1979 devaluation). I'd also prefer a measure of exchange rate regimes to control explicitly for the shocks that hit the economy during the time (as do LYS). I dropped a draft of this review on the ground outside today and it didn't move. Shambaugh would classify it as pegged; I'd say that there was no wind to move it.
This isn't to say that Shambaugh's classification isn't the best one available, and best is what counts. But best may not be very good.
Gripes
A fixed exchange rate policy is well-understood by bankers, practitioners, and academics reason that the authors find weak results when comparing peggers with others is that the latter group is a heterogeneous mess.
A second grumble is that transitions between exchange rate regimes are essentially ignored by Klein and Shambaugh. One thing we know with confidence is that most exchange rate regimes do not remain fixed forever. When a pegger switches to a float, it often does so during a dramatic currency crisis (UK, Italy and Sweden in 1992 , Mexico in 1994 , Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand in 1997 , Russia in 1998 , Brazil in 1999 , Argentina in 2002 . The international finance profession is somewhat obsessed by such events, which have been much studied over the last few decades, starting with seminal work by Krugman (for which, in part, he was awarded the Nobel prize). The book does cover some of this ground by using statistical hazard models to estimate probabilities that fixers will float and vice versa, but the analysis is mechanical and almost devoid of economics. Can one really compare the characteristics of exchange rate regimes while avoiding the transitions between them?
An empirically-oriented book on exchange rate regimes aimed at this audience should really provide more institutional detail, so that the reader can learn, at least superficially, how fixed exchange rate regimes work in practice. For instance, the operation of fiscal policy is dramatically affected by the exchange rate regime; in turn, fiscal policy is often constrained by the regime. This is an issue of enormous policy interest, especially in Europe and Latin America.
However "fiscal" does not even enter the index of the book. More importantly, there should be more descriptive history of the evolution of the international monetary system. The "modern era" of exchange rate regimes includes a large number of distinct exchange rate regimes which go unmentioned by the authors:
 The Latin pegs that were key to the disinflation programs of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and others.
 The implicit Asian pegs of the 1990s that existed during the run-up to the crisis of 1997-
98.
 The enduring pegs which continue to define the exchange rate regimes of Central-, Western-and Southern-Africa.
 The ongoing system of fixed exchange rates in Europe; all entrants to the Eurozone are required to remain fixed to the Euro for at least two years before accession.
 Finally, some of the current floats are quite "clean" with a large number of countries targeting inflation and abstaining from foreign exchange intervention almost obsessively (New Zealand, Canada, and the UK).
I try to fill in some of these gaps below.
Finally, there is the scope of the exercise. To me, most seriously fixed exchange rates (such as those of Denmark, Hong Kong, or Latvia) seem too constraining to be worthwhile; why not go all the way to currency union and give up monetary sovereignty (as countries do when they join the euro)? On the other hand, floating exchange rates seem far more volatile than any reasonable model would indicate, and this volatility seems undesirable and unnecessary.
How then should one choose in practice between fixing and floating? Such questions are not clearly answered in this book; indeed they are not even asked. This is not because they ignore some large segment of the literature; the literature has little of value to say.
The Authors' Trilemma
Any book that seeks to conduct a scholarly review and extension of a broad topic, as this one does, faces a trilemma: it can be comprehensive, balanced, or interesting, but not all three.
Suppose it is balanced and compelling, providing a single coherent and interesting viewpoint in a fair-minded way. In this case, it simply cannot be a comprehensive review of all the relevant territory, since discordant notes will inevitably have been omitted. On the other hand, a book may be comprehensive and interesting, but then it cannot be impartial; evidence must be unfairly discounted to ensure that everything fits into a single mindset. Klein and Shambaugh have chosen the first two desirable characteristics, and their book is both impartial and complete. Sadly, this comes at the cost of excitement and clarity; the weak results and caveats tend to leave the reader with mush.
Exchange Rate Regimes in the Modern Era is a wide-ranging and fair-minded but bland book. Did the authors make the right choice in the trilemma? I think that the answer is probably yes; the book fills a gap in the literature. So the authors have done a service to the profession by providing us with this book. Still, the balance and scope of the endeavor comes at the cost of presenting a single gripping viewpoint; the authors tend to eschew black and white when grey will suffice. Two Cheers!
The Fix We're In
I proceed now by following the layout of the book, but deliberately give up any attempt at being comprehensive. I begin with a selection of some of the grosser stylized facts that we know about the incidence of exchange rate regimes; these findings are complementary to those presented by Klein and Shambaugh. I then discuss both the causes and consequences of exchange rate regimes. I conclude by moving the discussion up a level, and questioning whether the habitual call for further research is warranted in this case.
6a. The Importance of Different Exchange Rate Regimes
Many countries in the world maintain fixed exchange rates, indeed, usually a majority of them (though this depends on time and the exact classification scheme). The prevalence of fixes seems clear from Figure 1 , which splits up the countries of the world into one of three exchange rate regimes (fixed, intermediate, and floating), using the four different popular classification systems. It seems clear that over the modern era, as during the preceding Bretton The volume of trading in foreign exchange markets is closely linked to the exchange rate regime, since almost all the activity occurs between currencies that are floating. Table B .6 of the 2007 BIS report shows that more than 97% of turnover was generated between pairs of floating currencies. 7 More generally, a bunch of the countries with fixed exchange rate regimes just aren't that big. economists like Klein and Shambaugh no longer study currency crises much is that they're becoming history.
6c. Does Size Matter?
It is easy to think that a country's size (population) affects its choice of exchange rate regime, but difficult to imagine the opposite. Creating and maintaining a central bank with its own monetary policy is a cost, one that will weigh more heavily on a small economy. line is provided for reference; if population were similarly distributed across fixers and nonfixers, the data would be plotted along the diagonal. In fact, the data are below the diagonal; fixers tend to be smaller than non-fixers. As already noted, fixing is especially popular for small countries. You might ask: How small? The answer is: quite small. There seems to be a kink in the data where country size starts to make much less of a difference; the vertical line marks a country size of 2.5 million people (around the size of Kuwait or Latvia). Countries much larger than that are more reluctant to fix, and when a country's population reaches the 10 million of Tunisia or Hungary, the distribution of countries is quite similar across fixers and non-fixers (look for the tick at 9.2≈ln(10,000) on the x-axis). There are 135 countries with populations of greater than 2.5 million, 75 of which have more than 10 million citizens. Size seems unimportant to the exchange rate regime choice for countries with even moderately sized populations.
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So the size of a country affects its exchange rate regime choice, but only a little. Very small countries tend to fix, but size is irrelevant for a wide range of countries. This should come as no surprise; China, the largest country in the world has (controversially) maintained a fixed exchange rate regime for years.
6d. How about Income?
It is even more difficult to find an empirical link between a country's income and its exchange rate regime. Some of the richest countries in the world maintain fixed rates (Brunei, Qatar), while others float (Norway, the United States). Similarly there are extremely poor countries that float (DR Congo, Burundi), but some fix (Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau).
This stylized fact is general, as shown in Figure 5 . Figure 5 is the analogue to Figure 4 but instead of graphing a country's population, it focuses on country real GDP per capita. The quantile plots for fixers and non-fixers lie close to the diagonal line, indicating that there are few systematic differences between them. 10 The level of a country's real income has little systematic correlation with its exchange rate regime.
6e. More Stylized Facts
Where economies do maintain fixed exchange rates, they are now usually fixed to one of two major anchor currencies: the American dollar or the Euro. 11 The attractions of the dollar are particularly strong. According to the most recent IMF data, 66 economies (out of 192 classified) used the dollar as an exchange rate anchor. It seems implausible that so many countries from so many parts of the world could be motivated to support a dollar link because of international trade.
Some small rich economies fix (Hong Kong). Some large poor countries fix (the Ukraine).
But all large rich economies float. The three most important currencies in the world are the US dollar, the euro, and the Japanese yen; all float. Other largish rich economies float as well (the UK, Canada, Australia, and Switzerland), as do many of the biggest and most important emerging economies (Brazil, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey). China has a big economy and fixes; it is the exception.
Regions differ, especially among developing countries. Sub-Saharan African countries (especially former French colonies) like to peg; central Europeans and Asians do not.
Oil exporters fix. Most OPEC members maintain de jure and de facto fixed exchange rates. That is especially true of OPEC members in the Arabian Gulf, of whom a majority fix The UK has not intervened since the Bank of England acquired its independence in 1997.
Nominal Exchange Rate Volatility means Real Exchange Rate Volatility. Mussa (1986) convincingly demonstrated that countries which float and accordingly experience more nominal exchange rate volatility also have more real exchange rate volatility. This characterization has been corroborated by others (Baxter and Stockman, 1989) , and never seriously challenged for low-inflation economies; it is now widely accepted. It is easy to understand if nominal prices are sticky, and indeed Mussa found little difference in behavior of aggregate prices across exchange rate regimes.
Summary: A Stylized Description
A disproportionate number of the smallest countries of the world maintain fixed exchange rates. But beyond that, size has little effect on regime choice, while income has none at all. So fixed exchange rate regimes characterize a large number of countries but a small proportion of global GDP and market activity. Switches in exchange rate regimes are becoming rare. Countries that do fix tend to peg to the dollar, although the Euro also has a set of its own peggers. Oil exporters, offshore financial centers, sub-Saharan Africans, and former French colonies tend to fix; inflation targeters, former Soviet Bloc members, and large rich economies do not.
Causes: How Do Countries Choose Exchange Rate Regimes?
7a. Friedman's "Daylight Savings" Argument Milton Friedman (1953) provided one of the most famous arguments for why all countries -at least those with low or moderate inflation -should opt for floating exchange rates. He wrote:
"The argument for flexible exchange rates is, strange to say, very nearly identical with the argument for daylight savings time. Isn't it absurd to change the clock in summer when exactly the same result could be achieved by having each individual change his habits? All that is required is that everyone decided to come to his office an hour earlier, have lunch an hour earlier, etc. But obviously it is much simpler to change the clock that guide all than to have each individual separately change his pattern of reaction to the clock, even though all want to do so. The situation is exactly the same in the exchange market. It is far simpler to allow one price to change, namely the price of foreign exchange, than to rely upon price changes in the multitude of prices that together constitute the internal price structure."
Friedman's argument is that nominal price stickiness implies that relative price adjustment is easier to achieve through nominal exchange rates than through prices. This argument is still widely seen as a powerful argument for floating exchange rates. It shouldn't be. We only adjust our clocks twice a year, by precisely one hour (unless you're in Arizona or
Hawaii, in which case you don't adjust your clock at all). The one thing we know about floating exchange rates is that they are volatile, as pointed out by Mussa (1986) and Baxter and Stockman (1989) . If we had to adjust our clocks by a different amount daily, we might well choose to adjust times instead of clocks.
7b. National Determinants of the Exchange Rate Regime Theory
Mundell's trilemma implies that the real consequences of different types of shocks should, in principle, depend on the exchange rate regime. A benevolent government should choose the exchange rate regime so as to maximize its insulating effects. This leads one to the conclusion that countries experiencing a lot of real shocks should choose floating exchange rates; the presence of nominal rigidities means that relative price flexibility is easier to achieve under a float. On the other hand, countries suffering mostly from financial shocks will tend to adopt fixed rates. As Stockman (2000) writes, "the evidence supporting the predictions of these models is only slightly better than the evidence for cold nuclear fusion" so it does not seem worthwhile to pursue this line further. There are also microeconomic arguments relevant to exchange rate regime choice.
Transactions costs are lowered with fixed exchange rates. It might seem hard to believe that such benefits are big, but fixes do seem to result in greater trade in practice (as chapter 9 of the book shows), and very small countries with correspondingly large trade do have a strong tendency to fix. Fixes also tend to lower the cost of foreign exchange risk, although the latter can be inexpensively hedged if the country has the appropriate set of derivative markets. And of course, a fix also decreases the incentives to reduce foreign exchange risk, so that departures from fixes might be inordinately costly.
In principle, the micro-structure of the foreign exchange market might provide an argument for official intervention to smooth or fix the exchange rate; see Guembel and Sussman (2004) . This seems currently like a theoretical argument of little practical relevance.
Governments certainly provide liquidity to the market in the course of smoothing the exchange rate and provide insurance to some of its participants; the private market also changes as a response (Killeen et al, 2006) . So market microstructure may well provide a justification for intervention in poor economies with thin financial markets. But as shown above, these economies do not fix disproportionately, and their governments rarely cite micro-structure in justifying their policies. Further, some rich economies with sophisticated financial markets (like Hong Kong and Denmark) fix their exchange rates. Also, fixers do not usually intervene in other asset markets which suffer from problems similar to those of foreign exchange, such as those for equities or long bonds. The most compelling argument for the rising popularity of microstructure arguments is not that they seem plausible, but that macroeconomic models are inadequate.
Empirics
If the theories for exchange rate regime determination sound a little lame, that is appropriate. It is generous to characterize the empirical performance of existing models as "poor." We currently have little understanding of the time-series variation of exchange rate regimes (why did Sweden float out of its fix in November 1992 as opposed to some other time?). Most plausible theories of exchange rate determination depend on slow-moving macroeconomic phenomena, so that it may not be that surprising that our models explain little variation over time. But our ignorance of exchange rate regime determinants across countries is downright embarrassing. One might imagine that we know why the United States floats and Estonia is fixed … but no. Very small countries, autocracies and former colonies are more likely to fix, but these factors collectively explain little variation in exchange rate regimes. Our attempts to explain the cross-country incidence of fixed exchange rates have thus far basically failed. If one assembles a panel of data, the between-country variation explained by countryspecific fixed effects is much larger than any within-country time-series variation linked to fundamentals. For instance, the R 2 in the panel regressions that Klein and Shambaugh report in chapter 5 more than triple as country fixed effects are added. But they, like others, are unable to link this substantial variation across countries to reasonable predictors of the exchange rate regime. The fixed effects represent features of an economy that are unobservable and cannot be modeled empirically; they reveal little of economic interest.
12 Frankel (1999) states clearly that no single exchange rate regime is appropriate for all countries or at all times. The data indicate that he is right; countries make different choices.
But that does not explain why it has proven impossible for our profession to determine the characteristics that lead one country to choose one regime at one point and another later on, or why different countries make different choices. The nature of how countries choose their exchange rate regimes remains essentially an empirical mystery.
Consequences: Why Should We Care about Exchange Rate Regimes?
I now turn to the consequences of exchange rate regime. Since any substantive effect of the exchange rate regime on growth would be important, that is where I begin. 13 I start with some naïve regression evidence.
In Table 2 , I report coefficients when annual real GDP growth is regressed on the exchange rate regime. The data span 178 economies from 1974 through 2007. There are four rows of estimates, one for each of the four popular exchange rate regime measurement systems. For each of the four regressions, I include (but do not report) a comprehensive set of time-and country-specific fixed effects. However, no other growth determinants are included;
adding controls for the savings rate, labor force growth, institutions, and so forth is likely to reduce the coefficients further. In each case, I treat the fixed exchange rate regime as the default regime, so that the top-left estimate indicates that countries which were in narrow crawl exchange rate regimes according to the IMF's classification grew some .8% faster on average than fixers. Robust standard errors are included in parentheses.
Unfortunately no clear results emerge from this simple exercise. (2004), Ghosh et al (2010) , and Klein and Shambaugh all pursue this strategy; none finds a strong robust effect of the exchange rate regime on growth. 14 This is unsurprising. Choosing an exchange rate regime is choosing a monetary policy. As such, the exchange rate regime should have little effect on real long-term growth, and it does not appear to. As a monetary choice it might however have implications for inflation. These are examined in Table 3a , which is the analogue to Table 2 but considers (GDP deflator) inflation.
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The results of Exchange rate regimes are flaky: eccentric and unreliable.
The issue of exchange rate regimes is a fascinating question, one that will surely intrigue economists for the foreseeable future. Still, to me the truly fascinating thing about exchange rate regimes is that … they're fascinating. They really shouldn't be. My best friend likes tea, while I prefer coffee. While this seems immaterial, one could, in principle, figure out the reasons for our preferences, and how they affect our lives. Exchange rate regimes are much the same. Governments of similar countries make different decisions on the exchange rate regime. These views appear to be strongly held and sincere, yet they seem to have neither discernible causes nor visible consequences. Perhaps it is precisely because these issues appear to be of purely academic interest that they continue to provide inspiration for our profession; the stakes could not be lower. Non-Peg Shambaugh 10.7** (3.0) Robust standard errors in parentheses; coefficients significantly different from zero at .05 (.01) level marked by one (two) asterisk(s). Country and time fixed effects included in all regressions but not recorded. Dependent variable is annual GDP inflation from the PWT 6.3. All deflationary observations (GDP deflation exceeding >10%) have been removed, as have all countries that have experienced a hyperinflation (>1000% inflation). Sample restricted to countries that are not "high income" according to the World Bank and are not in the MSCI Emerging Market Index. Each row represents a different OLS regression; each coefficient represents the difference between the exchange rate regime tabulated in the column head and a fixed exchange rate. .6
